In a recent publication in Nature Communications by Frauchiger and Renner (Nat. Commun. 9, 3711 (2018)), a Gedankenexperiment was proposed, which was claimed to be able to lead to inconsistent conclusions with a self-referential use of quantum theory. Thus it seems to prove that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Shortly after, Chen and Zhang suggested an improvement (arXiv:1810.01080) which can made the explanation of the Gedankenexperiment become consistent. Here we show that the original conclusions of Frauchiger and Renner actually came from an incorrect description of the quantum systems. With the correct description there will be no inconsistent results, even without modifying the original Gedankenexperiment.
In brief, the Gedankenexperiment proposed in Box 1 of [1] is a procedure among four agentsF , F ,W and W . They repeat the following steps in rounds n = 0, 1, 2, ... until the halting condition in the last step is satisfied:
At time n : 00, AgentF measures a quantum system R in state
and denote the outputs as r = heads or r = tails. She sets the spin S of a particle to |↓ S if r = heads, and to |→ S ≡ 1/2(|↓ S + |↑ S ) if r = tails, and sends it to F . At n : 10, Agent F measures S in the basis {|↓ S , |↑ S }, recording the outcome z ∈ {−1/2, +1/2}.
At n : 20, AgentW measures labL (containing system R and agentF ) in a basis containing
Here h L and |t L are defined as the states of labL at the end of the first step, depending on whether r = heads or r = tails, respectively. If the outcome associated to ok L occurs he announcesw = ok and elsew = f ail. At n : 30, Agent W measures lab L (containing system S and agent F ) in a basis containing
Here |−1/2 L and |+1/2 L are defined as the state of lab L depending on whether the incoming spin was |↓ S or |↑ S , respectively. If the outcome associated to |ok L occurs he announces w = ok and else w = f ail.
At n : 40, ifw = ok and w = ok then the experiment is halted.
According to [1] , this Gedankenexperiment can make the agents arrive at conflicting conclusions when they all * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn employ the same form of quantum theory. Some main points of the reasoning is briefly reviewed below.
(i) From agentF 's point of view: Suppose thatF got r = tails in round n. Then according to the above experimental instructions, she can make the statement StatementF n:01 : "The spin S is in state |→ S at time n : 10."
AgentF could then conclude that the later state of lab L is
(as presented in the paragraph before Eq. (4) of [1] ), which is orthogonal to |ok L . ThusF will further infer that StatementF n:02 : "I am certain that W will observe w = f ail at time n : 31."
(ii) From agent F 's point of view: Suppose that F observed z = +1/2 in this round. Note that ifF got r = heads at time n : 01, she should have sent F the state |↓ S , which can never be observed as z = +1/2. Therefore, F can conclude that Statement F n:12 : "I am certain thatF knows that r = tails at time n : 01."
Then F can further infer from StatementF n:02 that Statement F n:13 : "I am certain thatF is certain that W will observe w = f ail at time n : 31." This is because F infers that whenF got r = tails, the state of lab L is Eq. (4) which can never lead to the outcome w = ok.
(iii) From agentW 's point of view: AgentW can be certain that there will always be (w, z) = (ok, −1/2), i.e., the outcomesw = ok and z = −1/2 can never occur simultaneously. This is because, according to [1] , the state ofL ⊗ S at time n : 10 is
(as presented in the paragraph before Eq. (6) of [1] ), which is orthogonal to ok L ⊗ |↓ S . Consequently, in any round onceW obtainsw = ok, he can be sure that StatementW n:22 : "I am certain that F knows that z = +1/2 at time n : 11."
Combining with the reasoning in the above point (ii), he can infer from Statements F n:12 ,F n:02 and F n:13 that StatementW n:23 : "I am certain that F is certain that W will observe w = f ail at time n : 31."
Putting points (i), (ii) and (iii) together, we see that onceW obtainsw = ok, there should always be w = f ail. Thus the halting condition (i.e., bothw = ok and w = ok occur) in the last step of the Gedankenexperiment can never be satisfied.
But according to Eq. (7) of [1] ,w = ok and w = ok can occur in the same round with probability 1/12. Therefore, when this case indeed occurs, a contradiction is reached. (See page 4 and Table 3 of [1] for full details.)
In our opinion, however, the contradiction actually comes from the mistake in the above reasoning, not from quantum theory itself. There are two different ways to see where the mistake lies.
(1) According to some quantum interpretation theories such as the Copenhagen interpretation, a wavefunction collapses when a measurement is performed. Then the above Eqs. (4) and (5) are not the correct description of the corresponding states. To make it more obvious, let us write the initial state of quantum system R thatF will measure at time n : 00 as
When taking the phase difference θ = 0 it is exactly the same as Eq. (1) that appeared in the Gedankenexperiment in [1] . AfterF measures it at time n : 00 in the basis {|heads R , |tails R }, the Copenhagen interpretation implies that |init R collapses to either |heads R or |tails R . Either way, the information on θ is lost. Especially, even there was θ = 0 at the beginning, after the measurement the resultant state is still |heads R or |tails R , which shows no difference from the θ = 0 case. Thus, recovering the original value of θ from the resultant state is impossible. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that the later states ofL ⊗ S should take the form U
3 |t L ⊗ |→ S with θ preserved in its original value. Instead, there will be no fixed phase difference between h L ⊗ |↓ S and |t L ⊗ |→ S . Therefore, afterF measured system R, from the outcome she herself knows thatL ⊗ S will be in a pure state h L ⊗ |↓ S or |t L ⊗ |→ S with probability 1/3 or 2/3, respectively. But from agentW 's point of view, as he has no information onF 's measurement outcome before he makes his own measurement, he does not know the purification of the state ofL ⊗ S. Then the correct description of the state ofL ⊗ S is no longer Eq. (5) (which is a pure state with a fixed phase difference θ = 0). Instead,L ⊗ S will appear toW as a mixture (which has no fixed phase difference between its components) described by the density matrix
For the same reason, after F measured |→ S in the basis {|↓ S , |↑ S } at time n : 10, the wavefunction collapsed from |→ S to either |↓ S or |↑ S , and the information on the phase difference between |↓ S and |↑ S in |→ S = 1/2(|↓ S + |↑ S ) is lost. Thus, from agent W 's point of view, the correct description of the states of lab L is no longer the pure state shown in Eq. (4). Instead, lab L will be in a mixture described by the density matrix
With these correct descriptions, we can see that unlike Eq. (4), now the state described by Eq. (8) is not orthogonal to |ok L any more. ThusF cannot infer that W will necessarily observe w = f ail at time n : 31 as she did in the above point (i). That is, the above Statement F n:02 no longer holds, which also breaks down the logical link between Statements F n:12 and F n:13 . Similarly, unlike Eq. (5), now the state described by Eq. (7) is not orthogonal to ok L ⊗ |↓ S . Then W can no longer be certain that there will always be (w, z) = (ok, −1/2) as he did in the above point (iii). On the contrary, whenw = ok occurs, both the outcomes z = +1/2 and z = −1/2 are possible. That is, knowingw = ok can no longer assureW that there must be z = +1/2. Thus the StatementW n:22 does not hold, so that StatementW n:23 cannot be inferred either. With these results, we can see that the reasoning in page 4 of [1] is no longer valid, so that the statements in the last two columns of Table 3 of [1] cannot be inferred either.
In brief, if we take the point of view that measurements will make wavefunctions collapse so that the information on the phase difference is erased, then the key reason why the Gedankenexperiment in [1] had led to the inconsistent result is that the agents in the Gedankenexperiment mistakenly described the states of the labs as pure states (i.e., Eqs. (4) and (5)). But in fact they should be mixtures (Eqs. (8) and (7)). Therefore, when using Copenhagen interpretation and similar quantum interpretation theories, quantum theory will not cause any inconsistent in this Gedankenexperiment.
(2) On the other hand, in some quantum interpretation theories (e.g., the many-worlds interpretation) there is no collapse of wavefunctions. Then Eq. (5) can be taken as the correct description. This is because agentW can considerF and her particles as a unitarily-interacting closed system, and thus conclude that the post-measurement status is a coherent superposition. More detailedly, this is done as follows. Let |init F ⊗ |init S denote the initial state of agentF and particle S right before she measures system R at time n : 00, and h F ⊗ |↓ S (or |t F ⊗ |→ S ) denote the final state thatF obtains the output r = heads (or r = tails) and sets the spin of S to |↓ S (or |→ S ). FromW 's point of view, instead of applying the projective operators {|heads R heads| , |tails R tails|} on system R (whose state is in Eq. (1)) alone, at time n : 00 labL = R⊗F and particle S actually went through a unitary transformation
where Uh F S (or Ut F S ) is a unitary transformation onF ⊗S that maps |init F ⊗ |init S into h F ⊗ |↓ S (or |t F ⊗ |→ S ). Then the resultant state ofL ⊗ S is
and
we successfully obtain Eq. (5) from Eq. (10). From this deduction process, it can be seen that if we take Eq. (5) as valid, we actually accepted the following logic:
For any agent (such asW ) who knows nothing about what happened inside the lab (e.g., which outcomeF had obtained), the state of the lab should be described as a quantum superposition, in which all terms corresponding to all possible outcomes inside the lab are included.
But in this scenario, another problem will arise in the original reasoning in [1] . As stressed in [1] , all agents employ the same theory throughout the Gedankenexperiment. Therefore, when agent F measures S at time n : 10, from other agents' point of view, lab L = S ⊗ F should also be considered as a unitarily-interacting system. Let |init F denote the initial state of agent F . Then the unitary transformation corresponding to this process can be expressed as
where
Applying Eq. (13) on Eq. (10) (i.e., Eq. (5)), we know that the resultant state ofL
where IL is the identity operator on labL. This equation shows that the outcome (w, w) = (ok, ok) can occur with probability 1/12, which is in agreement with Eq. (7) To answer the question, we must note that different agents will have different point of view. Remind thatW and W both take the perspective that no collapse occurs in measurements (otherwise our above point (1) applies), and they do not know whetherF got r = tails or not before performing their own measurements. Therefore, following the same logic stated above that made Eq. (5) valid, fromW 's and W 's point of view, all terms corresponding to both h L and |t L should remain. That is, W and W will take Eq. (16) as correct, so they will not be surprised to find that the outcomew = ok and w = ok can occur in the same round.
But fromF 's point of view, she knows that she got r = tails. Thus it seems that she herself could take Eq. (4) as the correct description. However, when she is to infer the result of other agents, it will be a different story. As she knows that "W does not know whether I got r = tails or not " and they all use the same quantum theory, if she is wise enough, she should be able to infer that "W will take Eq. (16) instead of Eq. (4) as the correct description of the state of L before performing his measurement ". As a result,F should no longer make StatementF n:02 that "I am certain that W will observe w = f ail at time n : 31.". Instead, she should infer from Eq. (16) that StatementF n:02 * : "I am certain that whenW find w = ok at time n : 21, W will have a nonzero probability to observe w = ok at time n : 31."
Consequently, all those statements (especially Statements F n:13 andW n:23 ) in Table 3 of [1] that were inferred from the old StatementF n:02 will no longer hold. Also, when agentW findw = ok, he can make his own judgement from Eq. (16) directly that StatementW n:23 * : "I am certain that W will have a nonzero probability to observe w = ok at time n : 31." Therefore, the inconsistent results will no longer exist. In other words, ifF insists that both Eqs. (4) and (5) are the correct description of the states of the corresponding systems even from W 's point of view, then she is in fact not using the same quantum theory consistently throughout the whole Gedankenexperiment. That is, upon writing the state ofL⊗S as Eq. (5), she is taking the perspective that no collapse of wavefunctions occurs in measurement, so that both the terms corresponding to |↓ S and |→ S exist. But when she think that Eq. (4) is the correct description of the state of lab L even from W 's point of view (so that she can infer Statement F n:02 ), she actually take collapse into her picture because only the term corresponding to |→ S remains in Eq. (4) while the term corresponding to |↓ S disappeared. This is how the inconsistent results were introduced.
In summary, if we take the perspective of point (1) that wavefunctions will collapse when being measured, then Eqs. (4) and (5) are incorrect. Else if we take the perspective of point (2) that all measurements can be phrased as a unitarily-interacting process so that Eqs. (4) and (5) can remain valid, then StatementF n:02 becomes incorrect. Either way, the inconsistent conclusions in [1] come from its own faulty reasoning, and not from quantum theory itself.
